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ABSTRACT
The application of information technology in network control systems introduces the
potential threats to the future industrial control system. The malicious attacks undermine
the security of network control system, which could cause a huge economic loss. This thesis
studies a particular cyber attack called the replay attack, which is motivated by the Stuxnet
worm allegedly used against the nuclear facilities in Iran. For replay attack, this thesis injects
the narrow-band signal into control signal and adopts the spectrum estimation approach to
test the estimation residue. In order to protect the information of the injected signal from
knowing by attackers, the frequency hopping technology is employed to encrypt the frequency
of the narrow-band signal. The detection method proposed in the thesis is illustrated and
examined by the simulation studies, and it shows the good detection rate and security.
iv
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As evidenced in the past two decades, the information technology (IT) such as wireless
and networking technologies have been making profound impacts not only on our daily life
but also on various engineering branches. In particular networked control systems (NCS)
are made possible in which the physical system and feedback controller are situated in two
different locations and connected through wireless networks. The new development of the
NCS is important as often robots and other controlled systems have to work in hazardous
environments where wired connection is not allowed or prohibited. Moreover, the NCS
often shares communication channels with other users, which improves the efficiency of
communication. The block diagram in Figure 1.1 illustrates schematically the structure of
the NCS.
Discretized System
Digital Controller
Network N1 Network N2
-
6
?
ﬀ
Figure 1.1: Networked control system (NCS)
The NCS overturns the traditional structure of the control system that is a point-to-point
single loop control strategy, and allows multiple physical plants, controllers, actuators and
sensors to be integrated into a system of systems. This new structure helps control systems
to be adapted to the development of science and technology. It makes possible to integrate a
large number of nodes distributed in a large area into a large system, such as mobile sensor
networks [1], multi-agent systems [2], and automated highway systems [3] etc. In the near
future, the NCS can even be implemented through the internet so that control systems can
be distributed around the world. Furthermore, the NCS can reduce the cost, and is easy
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to maintain. Hence the NCS can be widely deployed in the industry, agriculture, military
defense, and out-space exploitation.
In the past decade, researchers in the control community have mainly focused their
research on packet loss, time delay, and synchronization problems of the NCS. However the
development of the NCS also gives rise to the security problem, due to the use of wireless
and networking technologies. Adversaries can launch attacks anywhere and anytime. The
security problem of the NCS has attracted great attention from the research community since
2010, especially after the news of the Stuxnet malware was made public. It was allegedly
designed to attack Siemens controller known as P.C.S.−7, and caused a huge loss on Iran’s
nuclear enrichment factories in 2009 [4], [5]. The Stuxnet malware can reside in computer
systems and programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and it can migrate from computers to
PLCs, and from PLCs to computers without launching attacks until it is populated to a large
percentage of computers and PLCs. When the Stuxnet malware finally launches attacks, it
replays the past outputs of the PLCs to conceal the actual situation of the control processes
from the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. Hence often the SCADA
fails to detect the replay attacks, and the results of the attack can be catastrophic. Since
the PLCs are widely used in the industrial control processes around the world, and Stuxnet
malware has since spread to many window-based computer systems, it becomes a very urgent
research problem for engineers and researches to develop new approaches and methods to
detect the replay attacks, and protect the industrial control systems.
1.1 Overview of the Existing Work
In the past several years, quite a few researchers ([6], [7], [8], [9], [10], and [11]) have paid
great attention to the replay attack in the NCS, motivated by the Stuxnet malware. An
overview of the existing work will be provided as follows.
Mo and Sinopoli are the first to study the replay attack in the NCS [6]. They assume that
the physical system is a discrete time linear time invariant system, and the feedback controller
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is designed based on the infinite horizon Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) method. The
simplest replay attack is considered in [6]: the replay attacker first hijacks the sensors and
records secretly the system output for certain period of time; when the attack is launched,
the past readings of the output data are replayed to the feedback controller so that the
attacks to the physical system can be hidden from being detected until it is too late. It is
observed by Mo and Sinopoli that the LQG controller uses the control input
u(t) = u∗(t) = Fxˆ(t|t− 1), (1.1)
where t is integer valued, F is the controller gain, and xˆ(t|t − 1) is the optimal estimation
of the system state of time t based on the output measurements up to time t− 1. Since the
LQG controller is the Kalman filter that is the optimal one-step predictor, the control signal
u∗(t) is readily available. Assuming that the system output is given by y(t) = Cx(t) + v(t)
with x(t) the system state and v(t) is white Gauss distributed, the output estimation error
δy(t) = y(t)− Cxˆ(t|t− 1)
is also white and Gauss distributed. As a result, ‖δy(t)‖2 has a χ2 distribution. For this
reason, Mo and Sinopoli proposes to use the χ2 failure detector to detect the reply attack,
i.e., the detector is described by the following equation:
gt =
t∑
k=t−N+1
[y(k)− Cxˆ(k|k − 1)]′P−1 [y(k)− Cxˆ(k|k − 1)] ≶ threshold, (1.2)
where C is the system output matrix, N is the detection window, and P is the covariance
of δy(t) = yt − Cxˆt|t−1. If the plant model is stable, then the output estimation error δy(t)
remains the same as pointed in [6], due to the fact that the attacker feedbacks the system
output in the distant past. Consequently χ2 failure detector fails to detect the replay attack.
Therefore Mo and Sinopoli propose to inject an independent identically distributed (i.i.d.)
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zero-mean Gaussian noises, denoted as 4u into the control input. Roughly speaking the
injected white Gauss noises are the authentication signal that serve as the time stamp. The
Kalman filter knows the injected Gauss white noises, and thus δy(t) remains the same when
the replay attacks are absent. However the injected Gauss white noises cannot be canceled
by the Kalman filter, if the adversaries launch the replay attack, and thus the χ2 failure
detector can successfully detect the replay attack. In addition [6] provides the quantitative
analysis on the relationship between the control system performance and the the variance of
the injected authentication signal, and the relationship between the detection rate and the
variance of injected authentication signal.
The work of [6] motivates others to follow. Because the injected white Gauss authentica-
tion signal degrades the control system performance, Thien-Toan Tran, Oh-Soon Shin, and
Jong-Ho Lee proposes a modification in [9] in studying the replay attack detection problem
in smart grid systems. In order to protect the customer equipment and obtain the accurate
power usage data from the smart meters, they propose to modify the original solution in [6]
so that it can efficiently detect replay attacks without increasing the burden to the system.
Specifically, they inject the authentication random signal 4u periodically and keep it on for
a certain time duration and set it off for another certain time duration within each period.
By carefully adjusting the portion of the period to add the authentication signal, the neg-
ative impact to the system is reduced while χ2 failure detector can still retain its sufficient
detection capability.
Fei Miao, Miroslav Pajic, and George J. Pappas propose a method in [10] to tradeoff the
control system performance and the detection rate for replay attack from another standpoint
of view. They believe that the competitive relationship between the attacker and the control
system can be described as a noncooperative game model. The outline of their paper can be
summarized as following.
The authors assume that both the control system and the replay attacker are able to
observe the state of the game, but none of them has the exact previous behavior information
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of the other. The game is assumed to work in three modes: safe, no detection, and false
alarm trigger. According to the state transition probability and the attacker’s action space,
the optimal switching control policy can be obtain to minimize the worst case control and
detection cost. The controller will shift between control cost optimal mode and the secure
mode as shown in Figure 1.2. By utilizing the suboptimal algorithm based on the value iter-
ation method for finite horizon stationary stochastic game, they obtain the optimal control
strategy at each stage.
Figure 1.2: The diagram of the switching controller
Due to the added authentication signal degrade the control system performance, Bixi-
ang Tang, Luis D. Alvergue, and Guoxiang Gu consider the method without injecting any
authentication signal into control input to detect the replay attack in [11]. They assume
that the communication channel is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), and the output
addictive noise η(t) is composed of the measurement noise ηo(t) and the communication error
ηc(t). A whitening filter is designed to convert the input and output signals into white signal
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w(t). When the replay attack takes place, the PSD of the controller input w(t) will not
be white anymore. Because the falsified feedback signal adds the communication error up,
which changes the PSD of the feedback signal at some frequency ωh at which the controller
has a high gain. In the absent of the replay attack, the PSD of w(t) is
Φw(ωh) = δ
2
dV (e
jωh)V (ejωh)∗, (1.3)
In the presence of the replay attack, the PSD of w(t) is
Φw(ωh) = δ
2
dV (e
jωh)V (ejωh)∗ + 2δ2ηcIm, (1.4)
where V (z) is related to the whitening filter, and δ2d depends on the variance of the process
and measurement noises, while δ2ηc represents the channel noise variance. The PSD detector
can be constructed as
Φw(ωh) ≷ threshold. (1.5)
By utilizing the communication error, the proposed method in [11] does not need to inject
the authentication signal into the control system while being capable of detecting the replay
attack. Hence this method does not degrade the control system performance. More impor-
tantly this method works for non-LQG control systems, and hence has more applicability
compared to other known methods.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
As discussed in the previous section, Mo and Sinopoli [6] are the first to study the replay
attack in the LQG based NCS, and proposed a method to tackle the detection of the replay
attack. By injecting the white Gaussian authentication signal with suitable large variance
into the control input, the replay attack can be detected by the χ2 failure detector by
testing the output estimation error that is white and Gauss distributed due to the use of the
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Kalman filter in the LQG controller. However the control system performance is degraded
by the injected authentication signal with large variance. Authors of [9] try to tradeoff
the control system performance and the detection rate by periodically injecting the white
Gauss authentication signal. It reduces the negative impact of the injected signal on control
system, but the detection time depends on the frequency of the injected signal. Moreover this
method can cause large time delay in detecting replay attacks due to the periodic absence
of the injected authentication signal. The results in [11] present an ideal method to detect
replay attack without injecting any authentication signal into control input. However this
ideal method is based on a very strong assumption that the communication channel of the
NCS is white addictive Gaussian channel. Otherwise the method proposed in [11] will not
work. Although [10] proposes another way to study the detection problem of the replay
attack, it does not balance well the control system performance and the detection rate. The
reason lies in the fact that the method based on the noncooperative game theory cannot
provide accurate prediction of the replay attack, which determines the switching between
the LQG controller and the secure controller (with injected authentication Gauss signal). As
a result it causes degradation of the control system performance seriously or induces large
delay in detecting the attacks.
The inadequacies of the existing detection methods motivate us to continue investigation
for detection of the replay attack, and to develop new methods and new ideas in order to
improve the existing detection method. The contribution of this thesis is summarized next.
• We propose to inject narrow-band authentication signal in the control input, contrast-
ing to the white Gaussian noises used in the known work. Specifically pure sinusoidal
signals are injected to the control input which clearly have narrow-band. As a result
spectrum estimation methods can be used to detect the replay attack. Because the
PSD of this narrow-band signal concentrates at certain frequency, it is possible to in-
ject the authentication signal with large variance while keeping the minimum negative
impact to the control system performance.
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• In our studies, we discover the replay attacker can evade the detection by launching a
smart attack strategy, if the frequency of the injected signal is known by the attacks who
may have the capability to estimate the frequency of the narrow-band authentication
signal. So we propose to employ the frequency hopping detection method to encrypt the
frequency of the injected signal. This way helps to protect the spectrum information of
the authentication signal from being estimated by attackers. Although the randomly
shifting frequency affects the detection rate to some extend, the frequency hopping
method still shows the high detection rate if large detection window size is used.
• Simulation studies are carried out for detection of the replay attacks. First the known
method based on white Gaussian authentication signals is studied using numerical
simulations. Second the spectrum detection method based on our proposed narrow-
band authentication signals is also studied in numerical simulations. The results are
compared, and conclusions are drawn, which show the superiority of the spectrum
detection method.
1.3 Organization of the thesis
The mathematical notation is standard, and will be made clear in later chapters. This section
outlines organization of the thesis.
• Chapter 1 provides the overview of the existing work, and the contribution of this
thesis.
• In Chapter 2, we introduce the background material, including knowledge on systems
and signals. For signals, sinusoidal functions and their PSDs are used to illustrate
random processes. For systems, state space descriptions are employed. This chapter
also covers the stability of finite dimensional linear time-invariant systems.
• In Chapter 3, we cover the LQG controller and Kalman filter. The LQG controller is
composed of two parts: one is the optimal state feedback controller, and the other is
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the optimal state estimator. Assuming that the system states are measurable, then we
can obtain the optimal state feedback controller. When the system states are not mea-
surable and the process and measurement noises are all white and Gauss distributed,
then the optimal state estimator, that is the Kalman filter, can be employed to obtain
the optimal state estimation. The use of the estimated state and the Kalman filter in
the optimal state feedback controller constitutes the LQG controller. The whiteness
property of the output estimation error is highlighted.
• In Chapter 4, the white noise method proposed in [6] is studied first. We then inves-
tigate the spectrum method by injecting the narrow-band authentication signal in the
control input to detect the replay attack. Because the spectrum detection method can
fail when the replay attacker knows the characteristics such as angular frequency of the
injected authentication signal, we propose to employ the frequency hopping communi-
cation technology to encrypt the frequency of the narrow-band signal. The simulation
results show that the performance of the frequency hopping detection method is better
than that of the white noise method under the same condition.
• Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing the research work and by outlining the
possible directions for future studies.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND MATERIAL
This chapter provides the background material of this thesis, including random signals,
power spectrum density, and state space description for linear time-invariant systems. All
signals and systems are in discrete-time with t for time index.
2.1 Signals and Systems
Signals can be mainly divided into two categories: one is the determinist signal, and the
other is the random signal. We will focus on vector-valued random signals in this paper.
For a vector signal s(t), its autocorrelation sequence (ACS) is defined by
Rs(k, t) := E {s(t)s(t− k)∗} , k = 0,±1,±2, · · · (2.1)
which is a square matrix and depends on both t and k in general. If Rs(k) = Rs(k, t) is
independent of t, then s(t) is said to be wide-sense stationary (WSS). In this case, the power
spectral density (PSD) of s(t) is defined by
Φs(ω) =
∞∑
k=−∞
Rs(k)e
−jkω, (2.2)
that is the discrete-time Fourier transform (DTFT) of s(t). The mean power of s(t) is
Ps = E{‖s(t)‖2}, and the power norm of s(t) is defined by
‖s‖P :=
√
Ps =
√
E{‖s(t)‖2} =
√
Tr{Rs(0)}. (2.3)
The following is an example of a WSS random signal.
Example 1. Consider a random signal
s(t) = A cos(ω0t+ Θ), 0 < ω0 < 2pi,
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where ω0 is real constant, A and Θ are real random variables, independent to each other,
and uniformly distributed over [0, 1] and [0, 2pi), respectively. The mean value of the signal
can be easily computed as follows:
E{s(t)} = E{A cos(ω0t+ Θ)}
= E{A}E{cos(Θ)} cos(ω0t)− E{A}E{sin(Θ)} cos(ω0t) = 0
(2.4)
by independence of A and Θ, and E{cos(Θ)} = E{sin(Θ)} = 0. The ACS of the signal can
be obtained by straightforward calculation:
E{s(t)s¯(t− k)} = E{A2 cos(ω0t+ Θ) cos(ω0(t− k) + Θ)}
= 1
2
E{A2}E{cos(ω0k) + cos(2ω0t− ω0k + 2Θ)}
= 1
2
E{A2} cos(ω0k) = 16 cos(ω0k) =: rs(k),
(2.5)
that is independent of time index t. Hence s(t) is a WSS process.
A linear time-invariant system (LTI) can be considered as a map that maps the system
input to the system output as shown in Figure 2.1.
G(z)- -
u(t) y(t)
Figure 2.1: The LTI system
Let g(t) be the impulse response, the transfer function of the system in Figure 2.1 is the
Z-transform of its impulse response:
G(z) =
∞∑
t=−∞
g(t)z−t, z ∈ C. (2.6)
The LTI system in Figure 2.1 is assumed to be bound-input and bound-output (BIBO)
stable. Furthermore, the functional relationship of the system input and output is given by
the convolution:
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y(t) = g(t) ∗ u(t) =
∞∑
t=−∞
g(t− k)u(k). (2.7)
If the input u(t) is a WSS signal, then the output y(t) is also a WSS signal in steady-
state. More importantly, the PSD of the output is related to the PSD of the input according
to the following mathematical relation:
Φy(ω) = G(e
jω)Φu(ω)G(e
jω)∗ (2.8)
Let the input signal u(t) be white process with mean zero and covariance identity. Then the
output mean power is obtained as
Py = E
{‖y(t)‖2} = Tr [E {Ry(0)}] = Tr{ 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
G(ejω)G(ejω)∗dω
}
(2.9)
by the fact that Φu(ω) = I ∀ ω. The above introduces the H2 norm of G(z):
‖G‖2 =
√
Tr
{
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
G(ejω)G(ejω)∗dω
}
=
√√√√Tr{ ∞∑
t=−∞
g(t)g(t)∗
}
(2.10)
2.2 State Space Descriptions
If every entry of G(z) in Figure 2.1 is a rational function of z, then it can be described by
state-space equations:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), x(0) = x0, (2.11a)
y(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t), (2.11b)
where (A,B,C,D) is a realization of the system with transfer matrix G(z), and x(t) ∈ Rn
is the state vector, u(t) ∈ Rm is the input, and y(t) ∈ Rp is the output. It follows that
A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ Rp×n, D ∈ Rp×m.
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Recall that G(z) is the transfer matrix of system, which admits state-space description (2.11).
We denote
G(z) =
 A B
C D
 := D + C(zI − A)−1B. (2.12)
For the above system described in (2.11), (A,B) is said to be controllable, if
rank
{[
B AB · · · An−1B
]}
= n. (2.13)
Similarly (C,A) is said to be observable, if
rank


C
CA
· · ·
CAn−1


= n. (2.14)
In addition, (A,B) is said to be stabilizable, if
rank
{[
A− λI, B
]}
= n, ∀|λ| ≥ 1. (2.15)
The above is equivalent to that if x∗A = λx∗ satisfying
x ∈ Rn, x∗ 6= 0, and | λ| ≥ 1,
then there holds x∗B 6= 0. Similarly (C,A) is said to be detectable, if
rank

 A− λI
C

 = n, ∀|λ| ≥ 1. (2.16)
Equivalently if Ax = λx satisfying
x ∈ Rn, x 6= 0, and |λ| ≥ 1,
then there holds Cx 6= 0.
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The state space system described in (2.11) is said to be internally stable, if all eigenvalues
of A lie strictly inside the unit circle. Considering the linear system described by (2.11), the
following results is well known [12]:
Theorem 1. The system described by (2.11) is said to be internally stable, if and only if for
any given Q = Q′ > 0, there exists a positive definite solution X to
X = AXA′ +Q. (2.17)
If (A,B) is controllable, then the system described in (2.11) is internally stable, if and only
if there exists a positive definite solution X to the Lyapunov equation
X = AXA′ +BB′. (2.18)
If (A,B) is stabilizable, then the system described in (2.11) is internally stable, if and only
if there exists a positive semi-definite solution X to (2.18).
Performance optimization is a central objective in feedback system design in addition
to feedback stability. An important performance measure for feedback control systems is
disturbance rejection. Its general formulation is schematically illustrated in the next page.
In Figure 2.2, d(t) ∈ Rm1 is the disturbance input and u(t) ∈ Rm2 is the control input,
while ω(t) ∈ Rp1 is the output signal to be controlled and y(t) ∈ Rp2 is measured output.
The transfer matrix from {d(t), u(t)} to {w(t), y(t)} is given by
G(z) =

A B1 B2
C1 D11 D12
C2 D21 D22
 (2.19)
where Gij(z) = Dij +Ci(zI−A)−1Bj for i, j = 1, 2 and A ∈ Rn×n. The transfer matrix K(z)
represents the feedback controller. Hence the closed-loop transfer matrix from disturbance
14
 A B1 B2C1 D11 D12
C2 D21 D22
-
K(z)
-
d(t)
u(t) y(t)
w(t)
-
ﬀ
Figure 2.2: LTI feedback control system
input d(t) to system controlled output w(t) is obtained as
Tdω(z) = G11(z) +G12(z)K(z)[I −G22(z)K(z)]−1G21(z) =: F`[G(z), K(z)]
that is the lower linear fractional transform (LFT). Minimization of the power norm of w(t)
is equivalent to minimization of the H2 norm of Tdw(z), subject to the feedback stability,
which is referred to as H2 control. If in addition, K(z) is required to be strictly proper in
minimizing the H2 norm of Tdw(z), then this is called linear quadratic Gauss (LQG) control.
We will be more specific in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Recall the feedback system in Figure 2.2. The state-space model of the generalized plant
G(z) is described by
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +B1d(t) +B2u(t), (3.1a)
w(t) = C1x(t) +D11d(t) +D12u(t), (3.1b)
y(t) = C2x(t) +D21d(t) +D22u(t), (3.1c)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector, y(t) ∈ Rp2 is the output vector, d(t) ∈ Rm1 is the noise
vector, u(t) ∈ Rm2 is the control vector, and w(t) ∈ Rp1 is the vector to be estimated, both
m2 and p2 usually are strictly smaller than n.
In this chapter we briefly describe the LQG controller design and Kalman filter design
based on which the existing detection strategies to replay attack will be introduced.
3.1 LQG Control
Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control is aimed at minimizing the variance or mean-
power of the controlled signal w(t), in addition to feedback stabilization. It consists of the
optimal state feedback control and the optimal state estimation. The optimal controller
minimizes mean-power of the controlled signal w(t) based on state feedback control, and
the optimal estimator provides the minimum mean-squared error (MMSE) estimation of the
system state. Because H2 is more general, we begin with the design of the H2 controller
before we introduce the LQG control.
Assuming that D22 is zero and the system state and external disturbance are known, the
H2 control law will be the full information (FI) controller:
u(t) = uF (t) = Fx(t) + F0d(t). (3.2)
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Recall the system performance index E{‖w(t)‖2}. If the feedback system is internally
stable under the FI control, then w(t) is a wide-sense stationary (WSS) process asymptot-
ically and thus E{‖w(t)‖2} is independent of time t asymptotically. Substituting the FI
control law (3.2) in to (3.1a) and (3.1b) yields
x(t+ 1) = (A+B2F )x(t) + (B1 +B2F0)d(t), (3.3a)
w(t) = (C1 +D12F )x(t) + (D11 +D12F0)d(t). (3.3b)
Hence the FI controller is required to minimize the H2-norm of the transfer matrix from
the disturbance input d(t) to controlled signal w(t). That is, the FI controller needs to be
designed to minimize the H2-norm of following transfer matrix:
Tdw(z) = TFI(z) :=
 A+B2F B1 +B2F0
C1 +D12F D11 +D12F0
 . (3.4)
The H2 solution to minimizing ‖TFI‖2 is given by
F = −(R +B∗2XB2)−1(B∗2XA+D∗12C1), R = D∗12D12, (3.5a)
F0 = −(R +B∗2XB2)−1(B∗2XB1 +D∗12D11), (3.5b)
where X ≥ 0 is the stabilizing solution of the algebraic riccati equation (ARE):
X = A˜∗X(In +B2R−1B∗2X)
−1
A˜+ C∗1(I −D12R−1D∗12)C1, A˜ = A−B2R−1D∗12C1. (3.6)
Since the system state and external disturbance may not be measured directly in practice,
the true system true state and disturbance need to be estimated. The corresponding problem
of the output estimation can be described by
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x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +B1d(t) +B2u(t), (3.7a)
u(t) = uFI(t) := Fx(t) + F0d(t), (3.7b)
y(t) = C2x(t) +D21d(t). (3.7c)
Our goal is to estimate uFI(t) based on measurements of y(t). In order to obtain the optimal
FI estimation, and control law, the MMSE estimator needs to be developed, assuming white
Gaussian noise d(t), which has the form:
xˆ(t+ 1) = Axˆ(t) + L [C2xˆ(t)− y(t)] +B2u(t), (3.8a)
u(t) = uˆ(t) := Fxˆ(t) + L0[C2xˆ(t)− y(t)], (3.8b)
where L and L0 are the respective state and disturbance estimation gain of the output
estimator. The MMSE estimation (L,L0) gains are obtained as
L = −(AY C∗2 +B1D∗21)(R˜ + C2Y C∗2)−1, (3.9a)
L0 = −(FY C∗2 + F0D∗21)(R˜ + C2Y C∗2)−1, (3.9b)
where R˜ = D21D
∗
21 > 0 and Y ≥ 0 is the stabilizing solution to the ARE
Y = AR˜Y (I + C
∗
2 R˜
−1C2Y )−1A∗R˜ +B1(I −D∗21R˜−1D21)B∗1 , AR˜ = A−B2D∗21R˜−1D21C2.
(3.10)
Substituting (3.8b) into (3.8a) yields the state description of the optimal H2 feedback
controller described by state space equation
xˆ(t+ 1) = (A+B2F + LC2 +B2L0C2)xˆ(t)− (L+B2L0)y(t),
u(t) = (F + L0C2)xˆ(t)− L0y(t)
(3.11)
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Let Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ be realization of K(z) described in (3.11). If D22 = 0, then
Aˆ = A+B2F + LC2 +B2L0C2, Bˆ = L+B2L0,
Cˆ = F + L0C2, Dˆ = L0.
It is important to note that the estimator in (3.8a) and (3.8b) makes the use of y(t) in
estimation of uFI(t). Hence K(z) = Dˆ + Cˆ(zI − Aˆ)−1Bˆ is called the H2 controller. If y(t) is
not allowed in estimation of uFI(t), then L0 = 0 can be taken, which is referred to as LQG
controller.
3.2 Kalman Filter
In engineering practice, various disturbances are unavoidable in operating systems, which
affect adversely to the controlled system outputs. Most these disturbances are white noises
with Gauss distribution. Therefore Kalman filter is widely employed in engineering practice
for estimation due to its easy installation, fast computation, low storage requirement, and
being the MMSE estimation. This section is focused on Kalman filtering.
Consider the more generally time-varying state-space system described by
x(t+ 1) = Atx(t) +Btv(t)
y(t) = Ctx(t) +Dtv(t),
(3.12)
where At, Bt, Ct, Dt are allowed to be time-varying, and v(t) is the random process with
Gaussian distribution of zero mean and identity covariance. Let xˆ(t|k) be the MMSE esti-
mate of x(t) based on measurements of y(·) up to time k. Then the Kalman filter can be
obtained as follow:
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xˆ(t+ 1|t) = (At +KtCt)xˆ(t|t− 1)−Kty(t), xˆ(0| − 1) = x¯(0), (3.13a)
Kt = −AtΣtC∗t (Rt + CtΣtC∗t )−1, (3.13b)
Σt+1 = AtΣtA
∗
t +BtB
∗
t +KtCtΣtA
∗
t , Σ0 = P0. (3.13c)
whereΣk = Σk|k−1, and BtD∗t = 0 and Rt = DtD
∗
t ≥ 0 ∀ t ≥ 0 are assumed. For the case
BtD
∗
t 6= 0, the above Kalman filter can be replaced by
xˆ(t+ 1|t) = (At +KtCt)xˆ(t|t− 1)−Kty(t), xˆ(0| − 1) = x¯(0), (3.14a)
Kt = −(AtΣtC∗t +BtD∗t )(Rt + CtΣtC∗t )−1, (3.14b)
Σt+1 = A˜t(In + ΣtC
∗
tR
−1
t Ct)
−1ΣtA˜∗t + B˜tB˜
∗
t , Σ0 = P0, (3.14c)
where A˜t = At − BtD∗tR−1t Ct and B˜t = Bt(I − DtR−1t Dt). The Kalman filter provides an
efficient and recursive algorithm for computing the MMSE estimate of the system state. An
important property of the Kalman filter is the following:
Proposition 2. For the Kalman filter described in (3.13a)- (3.13c), the output estimate error
δy(t) = y(t)− yˆ(t) is a white process.
Proof. For convenience, we denote xˆ(t) = xˆ(t|t − 1). Let xˆe(t) = x(t) − xˆ(t) be the state
estimation error. Its dynamics are described by
xˆe(t+ 1) = (At + LtCt)xˆe(t) + (Bt + LtDt)v(t),
δy(t) = Ctxˆe(t) +Dtv(t),
(3.15)
where yˆ(t) = Ctxˆ(t). The associated error covariance of xˆe(t) satisfies the following difference
Lyapunov equation
Xt+1 = (At + LtCt)Xt(At + LtCt)
∗ + (Bt + LtDt)(Bt + LtDt)∗, (3.16)
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by the independent of xˆe(t) and v(t). In addition, the cross-covariance
E{xˆe(t+ 1)δy(t)∗} = (Bt + LtDt)D∗t + (At + LtCt)XtC∗t = 0, (3.17)
in light of the fact Lt = −(BtD∗t + AtXtC∗t )(DtD∗t + CtXtC∗t )−1. We note that the error
covariance in (3.15) have the same form as the original random process (3.12) except that
(At, Bt) are replaced by (At +LtCt, Bt +LtDt). Thus denoting Φ˜t,k as the transition matrix
from time k to t−1 associated with (At+LtCt) and Φ˜t,k = (At−1+Lt−1Ct−1) · · · (Ak+LkCk).
We obtain that for t > k ≥ 0,
E{δy(t)δy(k)∗} = CtΦ˜t,kXkC∗k + CkΦ˜t,k+1(Bk + LkDk)D∗k
= CtΦ˜t,k+1[(Ak + LkCk)XkC
∗
k + (Bk + LkDk)D
∗
k] = 0,
(3.18)
If k = t, then E{δy(t)δy∗(k)} = CtXtC ′t +DtD′t for xe(t) and v(t) are independent with each
other.
3.3 Replay Attack
Since the networked control system (NCS) employs the information technology (IT) to im-
plement the system control through a shared network, it is vulnerable to malicious attacks.
A typical vicious attacker is the replay attack that attacks the NCS by concealing the mon-
itors or feeding the false information to the controllers. The replay attack undermines the
system stability and can damage the system infrastructures that typically employ many con-
trol systems. Therefore, detection of the replay attack is a very important subarea of the
security in NCSs. In this section, the replay attack will be described.
An example of the known replay attack is launched by the Stuxnet malware, which
allegedly is designed to attack the Iran’s uranium enrichment plant in 2009 and caused one
fifth of the centrifuges damaged [13]. According to the news media [4], Stuxnet secretly
recorded the normal operations status when system runs under normal condition, and then
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played those readings back to the system operators when the systems failed. It would
appear to the operator that everything was running smoothly while the system was already
damaged. It prevents the system from doing some actions to prevent abnormal operation.
Since 2009, the Stuxnet malware has been spread all over the world, which has been detected
on the computer systems in Iran, India, Indonesia and other countries [13]. This impels us
to develop methods to protect our infrastructures from the replay attack.
The first paper discussed the replay attack in networked control system is [6] that was
published in 2009. The idea of this paper is to inject a white Gauss signal in the control
input, and test the estimation residue for the output estimation error of the Kalman filter.
In [6], the χ2 failure detector used to detect the presence of the replay attack based on the
assumption that, the control system is discrete time linear invariant (LTI) with an infinite
horizon Linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) controller in which a Kalman filter is employed to
estimate the system’s state. The output estimation error variance of the Kalman filter will be
larger if the replay attack exists, than that when the replay attack is absent. This is because
the added Gauss signal is known to the controller and can be canceled in the Kalman filter
when replay attack is absent; Otherwise, it cannot be canceled that results in higher output
estimation error. Although the injected authentication signal helps to detect the replay
attack, it degrades the system control performance. In order to reduce the degradation of
the system control performance, a new detection strategy is proposed in [9]. By periodically
injecting the Gauss white noise into the control input, we can tradeoff the detection rate
versus system control performance. A new method is developed in [11] that employs the
channel noise and measurement noise to detect the replay attack, which avoids the injection
of the authentication noise, and hence avoids degrading the control performance. Besides
above methods, the game theory is introduced in [10] to detect replay attack. It opens a new
way to tradeoff the replay attack detection rate and system control performance. In [9], [14]
the replay attack detection strategy that injecting the Gaussian noise in the control input
method is discussed in smart grid.
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CHAPTER 4
FREQUENCY HOPPING METHOD
The existing detection method for replay attack as proposed in [6] does not have good
detection rate, because the injected authentication white signal cannot have large variance.
If it has large variance, the control system performance will be degraded significantly. The
reason lies in the white signal that is a wide-band signal, and it cannot have both small
mean power and high detection rate. In order to improve the detection rate and reduce the
adverse impact on control system performance, a new detection method is proposed in our
study. The narrow-band signal rather than the white signal is injected in the control input.
The narrow-band signal is centered at a certain frequency, and it can have small variance.
Thus it dose not degrade the control system performance seriously. More importantly the
proposed narrow-band signal helps to achieve much better detection rate than that of the
white noise, if both have the same variance.
4.1 White Noise Method
Mo and Sinopoli [6] are the first to consider the replay attack in the NCS that employs the
LQG controller. Their detection method for replay attack is based on the feedback control
system shown in Figure 2.2 of Chapter 2. The main idea for detecting the replay attack in
the LQG based NCS is to inject an authentication white signal in the control input and to
test the estimation residue of the output estimation error of the Kalman filter used in the
LQG controller. In the following we outline the detection method proposed in [6].
For the linear time invariant generalized plant model described in the previous chapter,
assumptions on D11 = D22 = 0, D
∗
12C1 = 0, and B1D
∗
21 = 0 are assumed in [6] for the
simplicity reason. Hence the state space description for the generalized plant model is given
by
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x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +B1d(t) +B2u(t),
w(t) = C1x(t) +D12u(t),
y(t) = C2x(t) +D21d(t),
(4.1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the vector of state variables at time t, d(t) ∈ Rn is the process noise
at time t, d(t) and x0 are the independent Gaussian random variables. As a result, the
controller and estimator gains of the LQG controller can be obtained as
F = −(R +B∗2XB2)−1B∗2XA, (4.2)
L = −AY C∗2(R˜ + C2Y C∗2)−1, (4.3)
respectively, where X ≥ 0 and Y ≥ 0 are the stabilizing solutions to the following respective
Algebraic Riccati equations (AREs):
X = A∗XA+ C∗1C1 − A∗XB2(R +B∗2XB2)−1B∗2XA, (4.4)
Y = AY A∗ +B1B∗1 − AY C∗2(R˜ + C2Y C∗2)−1C2Y A∗. (4.5)
Set the system control input as
u(t) = u∗(t) + u4(t), (4.6)
where u∗(t) = Fxˆ(t|t − 1) is the optimal LQG control input and u4(t) is the injected
authentication signal. See Figure 4.1 for the LQG based feedback control system. The
output estimation error δy(t) = y(t)−C2xˆ(t|t− 1) is temporally white in the absence of the
replay attack. In this case the covariance of this error is given by
Ω2 = E{[y(t)− C2xˆ(t|t− 1)][y(t)− C2xˆ(t|t− 1)]′} = R˜ + C2Y C ′2. (4.7)
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Figure 4.1: LQG control system with injected authentication signal
Let p be the dimension of y(t). Defining ε(t) = Ω−1[y(t)− C2xˆ(t|t− 1)], yields
1
p
E{ε(t)′ε(t)} = 1
p
Tr[E{ε(t)ε(t)′}]
= 1
p
Tr{Ω−1E{δy(t)δy(t)′}Ω−1}
= 1
p
Tr{Ip} = 1.
(4.8)
It follows that ε(t) is both temporally and spatially white. If the replay attack is present,
then it is shown in [6] that 1
p
E{‖ε(t)‖2} is greater than 1, but how much greater depends
on the mean power of the injected white noise. The above analysis leads to the following χ2
failure detector:
1
Np
(
t∑
k=t−N
‖ε(k)‖2
)
≷ τ, (4.9)
where τ is a threshold and N is the detection window size. In practice, it is desirable to have
big detection rate and small false alarm rate. However, if τ  1, then both the detection
rate and false alarm rate become small. On the other hand, if τ  1, then both the detection
rate and false alarm rate become big. Hence there is a tradeoff between the detection rate
and false alarm rate by designing an appropriate threshold τ .
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Consider the LQG control for the temperature control system discussed in [6], that aims
at controlling the temperature inside a room. Suppose that T ∗ is the desired temperature
and T (t) is the temperature of the room at time t. A simple plant model for the temperature
control system can be described by
x(t+ 1) = x(t) + u(t) + vp(t),
y(t) = x(t) + vm(t)
(4.10)
where the system state is x(t) = T (t)−T ∗, u(t) is the control input, vp(t) is the process noise,
y(t) is the measurement of the temperature tracking error, and vm(t) is the measurement
noise.
It is assumed in [6] that the process noise vp(t) and measurement noise vm(t) are inde-
pendent to each other, and they have the variance 1 and 0.1 respectively. Setting
w(t) =
 1
0
x(t) +
 0√
0.1
u(t) (4.11)
as in (4.1) results in the state feedback and state estimation gains
F = −0.618, L = −0.916 ,
respectively. If no authentication signal is injected, then the LQG cost is J = 1.7096. If an
authentication white signal is injected at the control input with variance vad, then the LQG
cost is changed to
J ′ = J + 2.618vad. (4.12)
Following the study in [6], we also carried out the simulation study for this particular
example. In the following simulation, we set the simulation time length to be 200s, and
replay attack takes place at t = 100s. The delay time τ can be set advance or randomly
decide by the replay attacker. The system output y(t) will be τ seconds delay after the
replay attack takes place, giving rise to
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ya(t) = y(t− τ), t ≥ τ. (4.13)
In order to obtain the statistical detection rate, 2000 trials are carried out in every
simulation. We also set the false alarm rate to be 5% at each trial.
Figure 4.2 shows the detection rate of χ2 failure detector for replay attack when the
detection window size is N = 5, the delay time τ = 100s , and no authentication signal is
injected in the system control input. From Figure 4.2, we find χ2 failure detector successfully
detects replay attack at the beginning of attack, but the detection rate goes to zero as time
goes. The reason of χ2 failure detector transiently detects replay attack can be developed as
follows.
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Figure 4.2: Detection rate without injecting authentication signal
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According to (4.10) and (4.11), we obtain the estimate output error referring to (3.15) in
proposition of Chapter3.
δy(t+ 1) = y˜(t+ 1)− yˆ(t+ 1)
= {C2x˜(t+ 1) +D21v˜m(t+ 1)} − {C2xˆ(t+ 1|t)}
= C2
{
Ax˜(t) +B1vp(t) +B2F ˆ˜x(t|t)
}
+D21v˜m(t+ 1)− C2 {Axˆ(t|t) +B2Fxˆ(t|t)}
= C2A {x˜(t)− xˆ(t|t)}+ C2B2F
{
ˆ˜x(t|t)− xˆ(t|t)
}
+ C2B1vp(t) +D21v˜m(t+ 1)
(4.14)
where y˜(t + 1) is the false feedback signal, and ˆ˜x(t|t) 6= xˆ(t|t) and x˜(t) 6= x(t) since replay
attacker feedbacks the previous system state to control system. We find that δy(t + 1)
should be very small when there is not replay attack, because x˜(t) − xˆ(t|t) is approximate
to zero, ˆ˜x(t|t)− xˆ(t|t) is zero, and measurement noise and process noise do not provide large
error. Otherwise, the output estimation error can be large unless the false feedback signal is
carefully designed.
In Figure 4.3, we find that the χ2 failure detector cannot detect replay attack at the
beginning of the attack. Moreover, the delay time in Figure 4.3 τ = 6 which is defined by
replay attacker. This is because the 95th control system output is the optimal false signal
that is close to the system output at 100s, and it can minimize the output estimation error
to avoid being detected by χ2 failure detector. Because the χ2 failure detector fails to detect
the replay attack, Mo and Sinopoli proposed to inject white Gaussian authentication signal
in control input to detect replay attack in [6]. The results in their paper are as follows.
Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, and Figure 4.6 show the detection rate with different detection
window size when the injected white Gaussian signal of variance 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6, respectively.
The delay time τ is decided by the replay attacker.
These three figures indicate two features: 1) the bigger the detection window size, the
higher the detection rate; 2) the larger variance of authentication signal yields higher detec-
tion rate. However, the large window size implies large time delay for the detection. The
large variance of the injected authentication signal implies poor system control performance.
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Figure 4.3: Detection rate under intelligent replay attack
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Figure 4.4: Detection rate with injected white Gaussian signal of variance 0.2
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Figure 4.5: Detection rate with injected white Gaussian signal of covariance 0.4
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Figure 4.6: Detection rate with injected white Gaussian signal of covariance 0.6
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With 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6 for the variance of the injected white authentication signal, the highest
detection rate is 11.5%, 23%, and 44% respectively, which correspond to the loss of LQG
performance is 30.6%, 61.25%, and 91.88%, respectively, compared with the optimal LQG
cost. It is noticed that the highest detection rate is 44% when the variance of the injected
authentication signal is 0.6 and detection window size is N = 10. This highest detection rate
scarifies 91.88% of system control performance with time delay of 10s in detecting replay
attack. Overall, the detection method for the replay attack with injected white Gaussian
signal is not efficient and practical. Therefore, more efficient detection method should be
worked out to tradeoff the detection rate and the system control performance.
Figure 4.7 shows the detection rate of injected white Gaussian authentication signal with
different variance but the same detection window size N = 5. In the next section, we will
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Figure 4.7: Detection rate with injected white Gaussian signal of detection window size 5
introduce a new detection method by injecting a narrow-band signal in the control input to
improve the detection rate without sacrificing much the control system performance.
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4.2 Spectrum Detection Method
It is desirable to develop detection methods that have high detection rate, while keeping the
minimum impact on the control system performance. The existing method cannot achieve
this goal, because it injects white authentication signal and the PSD spreads over all fre-
quencies. In light of the fact that the mean power of the authentication signal cannot be
large in order to minimize the adverse effect on the control performance, the way to overcome
the weakness of the existing method in [6] is to replace the white authentication signal by
narrow-band signals. We propose to inject the following narrow-band signal:
u4(t) = α cos(ω0t+ θ) (4.15)
over [t0, t0 + Tw], where Tw specifies the time horizon, and α and θ are random variables,
uniformly distributed over [0, αmax] and [0, 2pi), respectively.
Comparing to the white noise detection method, the spectrum detection method, provides
higher detection rate, and is more sensitive to replay attack. This is because the injected
narrow-band signal with the same variance does not affect the system control performance
too much, but offers a higher detection rate than that of the white signal at frequency ω0.
In the absence of replay attack, the output estimation error δy(t) has the same covariance
as in (4.7). That is, the injected cosine signal is canceled completely. Recall that u4(t) is
known by the controller. However, when replay attack is present, then the injected cosine
signal cannot be canceled completely, if the adversary has no knowledge on the frequency ω0.
As a result, the output estimation error δy(t) will have a cosine component at frequency ω0.
Therefore, we can employ the spectrum estimation method to detect replay attack. In this
section we will use spectrum detection method to detect replay attack. A non-parametric
estimation method is summarized as follows [15]. We only consider the case p = 1.
For a given discrete time signal {s(k)}Nk=1, the simplest method to estimate its PSD at
frequency ωh can be obtained according to [15] (page 22-24).
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Φˆp(ωh) =
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
k=1
s(k)e−jωh(k−1)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (4.16)
The standard biased ACS estimate of s(k) can be obtained as
Rˆp(τ) =
1
N
N∑
k=τ+1
s(k)s′(k − τ), 0 ≤ τ < N − 1. (4.17)
A different estimate of the PSD can be obtained as
Φˆc(ωh) =
N−1∑
τ=−(N−1)
Rˆc(τ)e
−jωhτ . (4.18)
where Rˆc is the standard unbiased ACS estimate and it holds
Rˆc(τ) =
1
N − τ
N∑
k=τ+1
s(k)s′(k − τ), 0 ≤ τ < N − 1. (4.19)
The unbiased ACS estimate has a windowing effect and offers a more sophisticated estimation
method which introduces the windowing technique by taking the PSD estimate at frequency
ωh as
Φˆs(ωh) =
N−1∑
τ=−(N−1)
win(τ)Rˆs(τ)e
−jωhτ . (4.20)
The above cover the case of ACS estimate are in the average sense. The advantages and
disadvantages of common used window as Barlett, Hanning, Hamming, and Blackman will
not be discussed here.
By utilizing the spectrum estimation method, the simulation results of detecting replay
attack are as follows.
Figure 4.8 shows the detection rate of replay attack with injected fixed amplitude and
fixed frequency cosine authentication signal. In Figure 4.8, the amplitude, the frequency
and the variance of the injected cosine signal are 0.6325, 1.26 and 0.2, respectively. The
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detection window size is N = 5. The detection rate of the χ2 failure detector and spectrum
detection method are shown in Figure 4.8. The spectrum detection method provides higher
detection rate than that of χ2 failure detector. Moreover, the detection rate with injected
fixed amplitude cosine signal is higher than that with injected white Gaussian signal under
the same condition. Corresponding to the peak detection rate of 9% in Figure 4.7, the
peak detection rate in Figure 4.8 is 14.2%. Although the detection rate is oscillating when
injecting the cosine authentication signal in the system control input, it effectively detects the
replay attack. However, there is a drawback to detect replay attack with injected sinusoidal
authentication signal: The injected signal can be copied if the attacker is intelligent enough,
causing this replay attack detection method to fail. According to our analysis, the spectrum
detection method fails when the attacker knows the frequency ω0 and sets the time delay to
satisfy relation:
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Figure 4.8: Detection rate with injected fixed amplitude cosine signal
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τω0 = 2pin. (4.21)
By doing so, the injected cosine authentication signal is repeated in the attacking duration,
and can thus be canceled in the Kalman filter.
Figure 4.9 shows that the spectrum detection method fails when the frequency of the
injected authentication cosine signal is 1.2566 and the time delay τ = 100s that satisfies
(4.21). The detection rate in Figure 4.9 validates the fact that the spectrum detection method
can fail, if the adversary has the knowledge of the frequency of the injected sinusoidal signal.
But it’s interesting to notice that the detection rate of the χ2 failure detector in Figure 4.9
is similar to that of Figure 4.2. Indeed, the pulse can also be canceled when the attacker
feedbacks the optimal false signal satisfies the two conditions, one is the constraint of (4.21),
and the other one is that the feedback false signal should as close as the system output at
the attack moment.
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Simulation time (t/s)
D
et
ec
tio
n 
ra
te
 
 
Spectrum detection method
χ2detector
Figure 4.9: Detection rate with injected fixed amplitude cosine signal under the intelligent
attack
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Figure 4.10 is the simulation result when injecting random amplitude cosine signal with
frequency 1.2566 in the control input and the time delay τ = 100s. The detection rate is
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Figure 4.10: Detection rate with injected random amplitude cosine signal
similar to that in Figure 4.9. Indeed, it does not change too much even if we inject fixed
frequency cosine authentication signal with randomly varying amplitude in the control input.
The simulation results in in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 illustrate the difficulty of using the
spectrum method for detecting the replay attack.In order to prevent the adversaries from
knowing the characteristics of the injected signal, we propose the other detection method in
this thesis by injecting authentication signal with random amplitude and random frequency.
Referring to (4.15), we set ω0 to change from one time horizon to another time horizon.
Hence we call it the frequency hopping method.
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4.3 Frequency Hopping Method
Frequency hopping method that is referred to frequency hopping communication in which the
frequency of the carrier signal varies from time to time to avoid interception and interruption,
is introduced in this subsection to detect replay attack. Before developing the frequency
hopping method, the frequency hopping communication is briefly discussed in the following
subsection.
4.3.1 Frequency Hopping Communication
Frequency hopping has been widely used in military communication and Bluetooth trans-
mission, since it has two outstanding properties: high security to protect from interception
and good resistance to the narrow-band interference. The principle of frequency hopping
communication is to extend the narrow-band signal from narrow-band to wide-band by mul-
tiplying the narrow-band signal with a wide-band signal. The covariance of the extended
signal is very small at all frequencies in [16]. More importantly, the narrow-band signal
shifts between different frequencies according to a encrypted pseudorandom sequence. Thus,
it is difficult to be intercepted and has a strong resistance to the narrow-band noise. The
frequency hopping method used in the thesis refers to frequency hopping spread spectrum
(FHSS) communication technology, which will be briefly discussed next.
Consider using binary frequency shift keying (BFSK) as the first data modulation scheme
to modulate the signal s(tc), which has been discussed in Chapter 2. The output signal of
the first modulation can be obtained as [17]
sd(tc) = s(tc) cos (2pi(f0 + bif4)tc) , (i− 1)Ts < tc < iTs, (4.22)
where f0 is the base frequency with unit Hertz, f4 is the frequency separator in the BFSK
scheme, bi is the ith bit of pseudo-noise sequence which is generated by linear feedback shift
register (LFSR), LFSR will not be discussed here, Ts is the duration of a single bit, and tc
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is the continuous time variable. Suppose that the frequency fi of the second modulation is
also determined by the pseudo-noise sequence. Then the resulting signal is
sp(tc) = s(tc) cos(2pi(f0 + bif4)tc) cos(2pifitc)
= s(tc)(cos(2pi(f0 + bif4 + fi)tc) + cos(2pi(f0 + bif4 − fi)tc)).
(4.23)
Eliminating the second part of the above sum, we can obtain the signal with frequency
centered around f0 + fi. By doing reverse process, the original signal can be recovered when
the pseudo-noise sequence and binary sequence are known by the receiver. When M-ary
frequency shift keying (MFSK) scheme is applied in the modulation, bi in (4.22) becomes a
variable that changes between [0, 1, · · ·M ]. A MFSK example can be found in Figure 4.11,
T is the duration of a bit, Ts is the duration of signal element, Tc is the interval duration of
frequency hopping in sub-channels.
Figure 4.11: Slow Frequency Hop Spread Spectrum Using MFSK (M=4, k=2)
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4.3.2 Proposed Detection Method
To overcome the shortcoming of spectrum detection method proposed in Section 4.2, we
employ frequency hopping technology in detecting replay attack. By randomly shifting the
frequency of injected signal, we can encrypt the injected authentication signal to make it
difficult to be copied. The simulation results are based on the temperature control system
model discussed in Section 4.1 [6]. The difference from the previous two detection methods
is to inject cosine authentication signal with random frequency in the control input. The
frequency of cosine signal is controlled by a pseudo-noise sequence generator that randomly
generates 5 different frequencies. They are 1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, and 1.8. We set the injected
cosine authentication signal with different variance of 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6, respectively. The
corresponding amplitude of injected signal are 0.6325, 0.8944, and 1.0954, respectively. We
set the detection window size N = 5 and time horizon Tw = 10. The frequency of the injected
cosine authentication signal will hop every Tw = 10s. We carry out simulation studies with
injected cosine signal with fixed amplitude and random amplitude. The simulation results
are as follows.
Figure 4.12 shows the detection rate of frequency hopping method with injected fixed
amplitude cosine signal. The peak detection rate in Figure 4.12 is 35 %, when the variance
of injected cosine authentication signal is 0.6 and the detection window size is N = 5. When
the variance of the injected signal is 0.2, the detection rate of spectrum estimation method is
not good enough. Moreover, the detection rate oscillates irregularly. But the detection rate
of frequency hopping detection method is generally better than that of white noise detection
method shown in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.13 shows the detection rate of χ2 failure detector when injecting the fixed am-
plitude cosine authentication signal in control input. The detection rate shown in Figure
4.13 does not change a lot from that of Figure 4.12.
Figure 4.14 shows the detection rate of frequency hopping method with the injected
cosine signal of random amplitude. The amplitude of the injected signal are random variables
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Figure 4.12: Detection rate with injected fixed amplitude cosine signal
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Figure 4.13: Detection rate of χ2 failure detector with injected fixed amplitude cosine signal
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Figure 4.14: Detection rate with injected random amplitude cosine signal
between (0, 1.0954], (0, 1.5492], and (0, 1.8974], respectively. There is not a big difference
between Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.12.
Figure 4.15 shows the detection rate of χ2 failure detector when injecting random am-
plitude cosine authentication signal. Figure 4.12, Figure 4.13, Figure 4.14, and Figure 4.15
show that the frequency hopping method doesn’t not improve the detection rate a lot than
that of the χ2 failure detector. Moreover, the detection rate of using frequency hopping
method doesn’t show a big progress than that of white noise method in the results. After
carefully analysis the detection window size and (4.16), we find that we cannot obtain the
accurate PSD when the detection window size is too small.
Therefore, we adjust the simulation conditions to do some simulation studies of frequency
hopping method. We set the simulation time T = 500s, the replay attack takes place at
250s, the detection window size N = 20, and the time horizon Tw = 60. The time delay τ is
decided by the intelligent replay attacker according to (4.21). The variance of the injected
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authentication signal is 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. We do 2000 trials each time to obtain the
statistic detection rate.
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Figure 4.15: Detection rate of χ2 failure detector with injected random amplitude cosine
signal
Figure 4.16 shows the detection rate of the white noise method and frequency hop-
ping method that with injected signal variance of 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. In Figure 4.16,
W − variance = 0.2 represents the detection rate of white noise method with the inject-
ed signal of variance 0.2. Slimily, F− variance = 0.2 denotes the detection rate of fre-
quency hopping method with the injected signal of variance 0.2. W − variance = 0.4 and
F− variance = 0.4 have the similar meaning. The detection rate of the frequency hopping
method periodically oscillates and drops between the time horizons. The shifting frequency
induces the estimation error in calculating the PSD of output error.
Figure 4.17 shows the detection rate of the spectrum detection method and χ2 failure
detector with frequency hopping technology, respectively. The S.D.M with variance 0.2
means the detection rate of the spectrum detection method with injected signal of variance
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Figure 4.16: The detection rate comparison between white noise detection method and fre-
quency hopping method
0.2. The similar meaning of S.D.M with variance 0.4. χ2 with variance 0.2 and χ2 with
variance 0.2 means the detection rate of the χ2 failure detector with injected signal of variance
0.2 and 0.4, respectively. The Figure 4.17 shows that the detection rate of χ2 failure detector
is smoother than that of the spectrum detection method, but the average detection rate is
lower.
After adjusting the detection window size, we increase the detection rate of both the
white noise detection method and the frequency hopping method. But Figure 4.16 shows
that the detection rate of the frequency hopping detection method is higher than that of
white noise method. It indicates that the frequency hopping method is better than white
noise method. More importantly, the frequency hopping method improve the security of
control system because this detection method can encrypt the injected signal. The encrypted
control system strength the resistance of malicious intelligent attack. Therefore, we can claim
that the frequency hopping detection method is more advanced than white noise method.
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Figure 4.17: The detection rate comparison between χ2 failure detector and spectrum de-
tection method
Moreover, the simulation studies show that the spectrum detection method reveals better
detection rate than χ2 failure detector with the frequency hopping technology. Although
the detection rate can be improved by increasing detection window size, both the frequency
hopping method and the white noise method scarify the detection time. Both of these
detection methods cannot perfectly tradeoff the control system performance, variance of the
injected signal, and detection time. The more effective detection method of replay attack
need to be studied in the future.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
With the advancement of automation and wide deployment of the information technol-
ogy (IT), networked control systems (NCS) become more and more important in today’s
digital economy. Compared to the traditional control system, the NCS can reduce the cost,
and is easy to maintain. More importantly, the NCS makes remote control possible, and
enable robots and other controlled systems to work in hazardous environments where wired
connection is not allowed or prohibited. As such the NCS is expected to be an essential part
and plays a crucial role in future industry, agriculture, and military, because the underlying
infrastructures are full of feedback control systems. However, along with the development
and the application of the NCS, its security becomes a more and more critical issue. Due
to the utilization of the IT, especially the shared wireless communication networks, NCSs
are vulnerable to malicious attackers. In this thesis, we have focused on one type of attacks,
referred to as replay attack that can be launched by malicious attackers from Cyber. Re-
play attacks can penetrate in control system secretely, reprogram embedded actuators and
sensors, or copy the system information and feedback the false output data to the control
system. Such attacks can destabilize control systems without being detected, or even destroy
hardware facilities. More seriously, replay attacks can damage important military facilities
of the country and cause huge financial loss. Therefore, it is crucial to develop efficient
methods to detect replay attacks. Although there are some studies in the existing literature,
the known solutions are not satisfactory which motivate this thesis research. We proposed
a new method in this thesis to detect the replay attack and this new detection method is
examined by our simulation studies. The thesis work is summarized in the following section.
5.1 Summary
In this thesis, we aimed at solving the detection problem for the replay attack. Since the
traditional χ2 detector does not perform well in detecting the replay attack by injecting
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white authentication signal, a new effective detection method is proposed in this thesis. Our
research on the replay attack detection problem are summarized next.
The existing method [6] injects white Gaussian noise as the authentication signal into the
control input. Although it is capable of detecting replay attacks, the variance of the injected
noises needs to be large, which degrades the control system performance. On the other
hand large variance authentication signal degrades the control system performance. For this
reason tradeoff has to be made between the detection rate and loss of the control system
performance. There exists some works trying to tradeoff the detection rate and system
control performance, but none of them achieves this goal. Basically the high detection
rate cannot be obtained without injecting white Gaussian authentication signal with large
variance, posing a significant challenge to the detection problem for replay attacks.
In this thesis, a new narrow-band authentication signal rather than the white Gaussian
signal, is proposed to be injected to the feedback control system at the plant input. Compared
to the white noise method that consists of the χ2 detector and the white Gaussian noises, the
spectrum detection method with injected narrow-band signal works better in detecting replay
attacks. Specifically the PSD of the narrow-band signal concentrates at a fixed frequency and
its neighborhood, contrasting to the PSD of the injected white Gaussian signal, which spans
uniformly to the whole spectrum. In addition it is possible to obtain high detection rate by
injecting narrow-band authentication signal with large variance without adversely affecting
control system performance seriously. Indeed we can inject the narrow-band authentication
signal at the frequency that is far away from the frequency content of the control signal.
The high detection rate based on the spectrum detection method can be obtained by
injecting the narrow-band authentication signal with fixed frequency and fixed amplitude in
the control input. The detection rate curve of the spectrum detection method with narrow-
band authentication signal can be seen in Figure 4.8. However, this high detection rate is
obtained assuming that the product of the time delay and the frequency of the injected signal
is not multiple of 2pi. When the adversaries are intelligent enough, they can estimate the
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frequency and the amplitude of the injected authentication signal, and set the time delay
to be multiple of 2pi. As a result, the spectrum detection method can fail in detecting the
replay attack when the intelligent attack deploys the above strategy. This is validated by
our simulation result in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10.
In order to protect the information of the injected authentication signal from being
estimated by replay attackers, we propose to encrypt the frequency of the injected signal by
employing the frequency hopping communication technology, which is termed as frequency
hopping detection method. See Section 4.3 for details. When injecting the narrow-band
authentication signal at high frequencies, better detection rates than that of the white noise
method can be obtained, assuming the same variance for the narrow-band authentication
signal and for the white Gauss authentication signal. Moreover the longer the detection
window size is employed, can the better detection rate be obtained. Figure 4.16 demonstrates
the effectiveness of the frequency hopping detection method. To be specific, it injects narrow-
band authentication signal with smaller variance than that of the white Gauss authentication
signal. Yet the simulation results show that that the frequency hopping detection method
can provide better detection rate than that of the χ2 detector associated with white Gauss
authentication signal. However large detection window size implies large time delay that is
the cost associated with our proposed frequency hopping detection method.
5.2 Future Studies
In this thesis, we have studied the detection of replay attacks. The frequency hopping detec-
tion method is proposed and shown to be successful in detecting replay attacks. However, the
research work in this thesis is not completed yet. The following outlines possible directions
for future studies in this important research problem area.
1. In [6], Mo and Sinopoli provide the integral theoretic analysis of the relationship be-
tween the detection rate of the replay attack, and the LQG performance loss when
injected authentication signals are white Gaussian noises. These analysis results help
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readers to understand the quantitative tradeoffs between the detection rate and per-
formance loss using the χ2 detector. Similar to [6], the theoretical study on the use
of narrow-band signal in detection of the replay attack needs to be carried out. For
instance the quantitative analysis on the loss of the LQG performance cost needs to be
derived. At present we do not have an explicit expression on the LQG cost loss when
the narrow-band signals are employed authentication signals.
2. Most of the existing works analyze the detection rate of the replay attack has been
focused on the plant input by injecting the authentication signal at the control input.
Because replay attacks employ delayed output measurements, injecting the authen-
tication signal at the plant outputs should be more effective. In [11], it shows that
the channel noise at the system output can be more effective than injected noises at
the system input in detection of the replay attacks. It will be interesting to study
how the authentication signal can be injected at the system output in order to im-
prove the detection rate while keeping minimum adverse effects on the control system
performance.
3. Even though the existing works and our work in this thesis demonstrate the effective-
ness of the various detection methods, not all the control systems are based on LQG
controller. Therefore, it is essential to study the detection method for replay attacks
for more general types of the feedback control systems, including those based on Bode
design methods, PID control, and H∞ control.
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